ax. There is no way to catch yourself as you go in on skis.

• Three people on any glacier are way better than two. On a known heavily crevassed glacier, three people should be considered mandatory.

• Bring a VHS radio and know how to use it. In the winter the margin of error is considerably smaller than on a summer trip.

• Bring walkie-talkies to communicate with the party on the outside.

• Bring a pair of mini ascenders. I am confident that I could have worked these in lieu of the prusiks and my injury. Working 5mm prusiks on a 8mm rope with knots under 250 pounds of tension is no picnic in freezing temperatures! (Source: R.M.)

FALL ON ICE, INATTENTION

Alberta, Banff National Park, Professor Falls

On March 20, after instructing an ice climbing session on this popular Grade 4 ice climb, J.M. tripped on easy terrain while descending to the second rappel. He fell over a six meter pitch and sustained a dislocated shoulder and a back injury. One member of the party walked out for help, and the victim was evacuated by heli-sling shortly thereafter by Warden Service rescue crews. (Source: Parks Canada Warden Service)

Analysis

Care and attention are necessary even on easy ground, especially when one has crampons on. (Source: Nancy Hansen)

RAPPEL ERROR—INADEQUATE ANCHOR, WEATHER, CLIMBING ALONE

Alberta, Jasper National Park, Mount Snowdome, Slipstream

On the afternoon of March 24, M.G. and C.G. made their way up the Dome Glacier to establish a basecamp below Mount Snowdome. Their objective was to climb "Slipstream" (alpine grade VI, water ice grade 4+, 925 meters). This alpine ice climb forms most years on the east face of Mount Snowdome. The party awoke early and discussed plans. The weather was changing for the worse, and M.G. decided not to climb. C.G. decided to solo the route and departed camp at 0400. He took with him one ice screw and a 40-meter section of 8.5mm rope. His intended route down was the standard descent route to the south. At daybreak, M.G. observed his partner ascending the route.

By midday he was just below the top of the route. Throughout the morning the weather had continued to deteriorate with cloud build up and increased winds. At this time M.C. observed his partner starting to rappel the route. He saw a couple of rappels before the clouds descended and C.G. was obscured from view. About 30 minutes later M.C. observed a large avalanche coming out of the cloud and down the route. Fearing that his partner had been caught in the avalanche he quickly made his way back to the road and called for help. His call was patched through to the RCMP. The Jasper Warden Service was notified at 1630. Wardens on scene at 1650 spotted what they believed to be C.G. high on the climb continuing to make his way down.

However, high winds and poor visibility over a distance of five kilometers made it impossible to be absolutely certain that what they were viewing through

their spotting scope was C.G. At 1744 the rescue helicopter arrived from Golden and flew to the route with rescuers on board. The body of C.G. was spotted on the glacier at the base of the climb approximately 900 meters below his last observed position at mid-day. At 1825 C.G.'s body was slung off the glacier to the staging area at the Icefield Center where an ambulance was waiting. C.G. was pronounced dead at the staging area.

Analysis

C.G.'s body was found with the climbing rope passed through his belay device, a prusik attached and the ends of the rope tied together. All indications point to anchor failure being the likely cause of his fall. There was no Abalokov cord attached to his rope, which indicates that he may have been using a bollard or icicles to rappel off. He was found with his Abalokov hook, but his only ice screw was not on him when he arrived at the ambulance. C.G. was not found in avalanche debris, so whether the initial avalanche or subsequent unseen avalanches contributed to his fall is unknown. It is likely that C.G. decided to rappel the route due to strong winds and poor visibility on the summit ice cap. The ice cap is crevassed, so navigating to the descent route in poor visibility while climbing alone would have been very hazardous. The avalanche forecast for the day as issued by the Jasper Warden Service rated the avalanche danger in the alpine as high. (Source: Jasper National Park Warden Service, R.W.)

FALL ON SNOW, POOR POSITION

Alberta, Jasper National Park, Parker Ridge

On May 6, a group of mountaineers were practicing crevasse rescue at Parker Ridge. The group was working in roped teams of three. A person on one end of the rope would jump off a corniced ridge, while the other two people on the rope would arrest the fall and then perform the "rescue". A.L.'s group performed the rescue practice once successfully and then changed the order of the rope team to practice again. A.L. was facing away from the cornice when the person on the end of the rope jumped off. A.L. was spun around quickly and ended up with a spiral fracture in her lower leg. The rest of the group splinted her leg and then carried her out on a tarpaulin. (Source: A.L.)

Analysis

This particular accident may have been prevented if A.L. had been facing the direction of the cornice and "victim". It is also possible that the group was getting "aggressive" in their practice, and the victim jumped farther than before, creating a significant sudden jerk on the rope. In a real crevasse fall, team members may not always be facing the right direction, but the rope should be kept tight enough between members to ensure there is no sudden and great force of pull on the rope. It is important even in practice to ensure that the rope is kept tight. (Source: Nancy Hansen)

FALL ON ROCK, POOR CONDITIONS

Alberta, Mount McGillivray, Kahl Crack

On July 16, D.W. was leading the third pitch of this 200 meter high 5.5 rock climb. The crack in which he was supposed to be climbing and placing gear