

received deep facial cuts, extensive abrasions, broken ribs and shock. He was evacuated by the party down the steep gully to the floor of the troughs. Once down Tyrone insisted he could walk out. This he did under the careful guidance of three of the party.

*Source:* Jack Hazle, *The Mountaineer* 50:118-19, 1956.

*Analysis:* (J. Hazle). The first incident emphasizes the need to belay the leader across this pitch. The second demonstrates how easy it is to get out of control on hard snow and how dangerous it can be in a narrow couloir with a restricted run-out. Practice and more practice in glissade is necessary to minimize these occurrences.

*Washington, Cascade Pass Area*—On September 16, 1956 a party of ten mountaineers were on their way to attempt Boston Peak at about 5:00 a.m. They were working their way up a 25-degree glacier worn rock slope. The climbers were unroped and were taking separate routes. On the slope there was a huge rectangular rock slab which appeared to be resting securely. When Helene Glass touched it, however, it slid toward her. As she attempted to jump out of its way, she slipped, fell and began sliding down the smooth rock in front of the huge moving block. A small rock rib caused the block to be deflected just as Miss Glass appeared on the point of being crushed. Other than being shaken up, her injuries were not severe.

Lincoln Hales, the trip leader, was roughly 30-40 feet above Miss Glass when the rock started to slide. He heard the noise. He turned his head, saw what was happening and immediately he rushed down the slope. In his haste, he slipped, fell and broke his leg. Later examination demonstrated two spiral breaks in each bone of the lower leg and a minor break of the ankle.

The leg was immobilized by members of the party. Another climbing party of four was contacted and evacuation was accomplished by the combined forces of the two groups in nine hours.

*Source:* Jack Hazle, *The Mountaineer* 50: 120, 1956.

*Analysis:* (J. Hazle). Miss Glass was wearing triconi-nailed boots on a hard, smooth surface; she therefore did not have good friction and this undoubtedly contributed to her slipping. It also emphasizes the need for caution near all large boulders on slopes. Hale's accident also shows the need for care where there is loose rock on sloping rock. (See Peñasco Springs Accident, N.M.)

*Washington, Snoqualmie*—On February 19, 1956 Everett Lasher and Gene Prater began a winter ascent of the 4,500-foot ridge lying north of Camp Mason on the Snoqualmie Pass Highway. It was a bitterly cold, overcast day with a sharp wind. As they made their way through the timber at the lower levels their snow shoes stood them in good stead as the snow was powdered and deep with no sign of a crust. As the party neared timber line, however, a crust was found to have formed on the windward side of a slight ridge running to the top of the main ridge. Here the snow shoes were removed and the two-man party continued upward, following the crest of this secondary ridge.

At a point near the top they were making a switchback on the lee side of this ridge when a slight "thud" was heard and a section of snow that had been cut by the switchback settled deeply. It was definitely wind slab and the climbers recognized it as such immediately. The party then crossed

over and continued their ascent on the windward side of the ridge where they found packed, powdered snow blowing considerably. They continued to the crest of the main ridge without further incident.

Upon starting the descent, Lasher moved west down the crest of the ridge to observe some fantastic snow carvings. It was also his desire to make a descent out of the wind that had now picked up in velocity and was making the windward slope a whirling blanket of blowing snow cutting visibility to zero. As the temperature was well below freezing they felt no fear of avalanche danger.

In the center of the lee slope, Lasher put on his snow shoes and made final preparations for glissading. His companion followed suit. The snow had a hard crust and the ice axe was used extensively to control the descent. Lasher took off and Prater finally followed at some distance. After descending approximately two-thirds of the way down the slope Lasher stopped to pick out the best route to connect with the upward route and, as he stated, he noted the trees continued to move on either side of him. Looking up the slope he discovered that the hillside was avalanching.

There was not time to remove his snow shoes. He lay on his back, head uphill and used a swimming motion in a vain attempt to remain on the surface. Several hundred feet down the slope his snow shoes caught on some obstruction and he was flung head first down the slope and quickly came to a stop. He was completely buried except for his left leg. As he made a frenzied attempt to dig his face free of the snow he lapsed into unconsciousness.

Prater meanwhile had removed his snow shoes before the avalanche started but was caught in the upper edge and was carried some distance down the slope. He fortunately stopped in a sitting position on top of the snow and immediately started down the slope in search of Lasher, remembering to mark his original position. He went in the direction that Lasher had been in before the avalanche and quickly found Lasher's red snow shoe.

He quickly dug out the unconscious man's head and then freed the rest of his body. After checking the pulse and breathing, he cut some boughs from a nearby tree and leveled a flat spot in the snow. Removing snow shoes and pack from the unconscious man, he checked for broken bones. Lasher soon came to and was assisted to the bough bed and covered with all the extra clothing. Lasher was shaking violently, but said that it felt good as it was stimulating his circulation. They both felt that he had the full use of all his limbs.

Prater now left in search of his own snow shoes but succeeded in finding only one of them. When he returned, Lasher was sitting up and claimed he felt well enough to travel. Prater then proceeded to lash limbs to Lasher's broken snow shoe and then improvised a snow shoe out of the frame of Lasher's pack to replace his own lost shoe. Both ice axes were lost and could not be found. They then reached the highway without too much difficulty.

*Source:* J. Hazle, *The Mountaineer* 49: 4-5, 1956.

*Analysis:* (J. Hazle). The party was undersized due to several people dropping out at the last moment. Both men, however, were experienced in winter travel and felt this to be no particular detriment to their venture.

With all deference to the combined experience of the two climbers the following points should be made and noted.

Whereas the climbers were seemingly aware of the limitations relating to the weather, terrain, and their own individual ability, they nevertheless erred in judgment; the first warning should have been enough to have kept them from triggering the mishap that eventually caught them. Had they realized the full danger of wind slab slopes they would have followed their original route in making their descent. The warning of what might have been encountered on the lee slope on the ascent should have been apparent enough to prove that the slope was unsafe even though in their opinion the weather was not indicative of avalanche conditions. The agreement to keep off the windblown slope with its ensuing physical discomforts was undoubtedly caused somewhat by over-confidence and lack of foresight. The original route had proven a safe one and should have been used for the descent regardless of personal desires.

It is of special interest and importance to note that the swimming motion (backstroke) used by Lasher was in his estimation largely responsible for keeping him on the surface until he was upended by the snow shoe getting caught. In fact he felt that if the route had been free of obstructions he might have remained on top until the slide stopped. (See accident New Hampshire—Mt. Washington.)

*Oregon, Mt. Hood*—On July 29, 1956 two groups of American Youth Hostel climbers totaling 18 persons climbed Mt. Hood with one guide. This occurred because both groups arrived in Portland at about the same time and hoped to climb Mt. Hood. The usual leader, Carl Schnoor, could lead only on the 29th and he had agreed to take the first group on the climb. The second group was unable to locate a leader; the two groups were therefore reluctantly combined. This had been done two weeks previously with no harmful results.

The party was well equipped with proper climbing boots and crampons. There were 15 ice axes and four alpenstocks. On the way up the chute on the regular route of ascent Carl Schnoor came upon a poorly equipped party of two (a young boy and a man) who had neither ice axe nor crampons. Fearing for their safety, Schnoor borrowed an axe from one of his party and gave it to the man in the small party. Schnoor had given instructions to his party about the use of the ice axe and crampons on the ascent.

The entire group of 19 was tied into one rope which consisted of two 120-foot lengths tied together. The weather was beautiful. The ascent was made uneventfully. The accident occurred at about 3:45 p.m. during the descent. The afternoon sun had softened the snow in the chute, and as a result, the bucket steps were fairly long steps. The members of the party reported that a couple of the short girls had difficulty in descending for this reason, and had slipped a little trying to reach the steps. When the party had passed the large crevasse on the descent and were strung out below it, the slide began in the middle of the party. According to reports, Schnoor, Ron Heinrich and others of the party attempted to arrest the slide with their ice axes. It was difficult to make an effective arrest as they were tied so closely. The entire party of 19 slid approximately 200 feet into a fumarole type moat after bouncing off the rocks near the upper base of Crater Rock at 10,500 feet.