

to survive. Rather than wandering around in a whiteout and risking becoming more seriously injured or disoriented, they protected themselves from the elements and called for help when they were unsure they would be able to self-rescue.

The leader of the climb made the following points:

- There had been forecasts of weather turning bad late in the day. Doing this climb with a fairly large party and uncertain weather and nothing more than emergency bivy gear left a smaller margin of safety.

- Route finding: Although I had climbed Leuthold before I did not remember the spot where we went to the right. Had I been paying proper attention I should have figured it out soon enough to get back on Leuthold and we would have made the summit before dark.

- Leadership: When the party started going slowly I should have taken control more. One option would have been to shorten the rope so I could communicate with the team better.

- Poor equipment planning: In hindsight, I can't believe that I had not included a stove in our equipment. Our near hypothermia could have been avoided. Also, the frostbite, from which one other team member and I have fully recovered, could have been avoided.

- Communication: When we originally called 911, we stated our intent to descend in the morning if the condition of the team did not deteriorate any further. We were advised to stay where we were and that a team would be mobilized to ascend. One other team member and myself were borderline hypothermic early in the evening but our condition improved in the snow cave. Although we communicated to the people at the rescue base that we were all ambulatory but cold, we should have been more assertive in holding to our decision to descend on our own in the morning. In our attempt to be agreeable with the SAR effort we needlessly endangered several of the rescuers.

A final note from Steve Rollins: Avalanche danger rose quickly during this storm, threatening to prevent rescuers from being able to reach the stranded party safely. Had conditions been any worse, it is possible rescue efforts would have been postponed, resulting in the party being stranded for an even longer period of time. Climbers should be aware that rescuer safety always takes precedence and therefore rescues are not always possible. (Sources: Steve Rollins—Portland Mountain Rescue; David Byrne—35; Jim Brewer—48; Bob Pelletie—38; Jared Cogswell—31; Keith Campbell—44; and a story from *The Oregonian*.)

FALL ON ROCK—CLIMBER LOWERED OFF END OF ROPE BY BELAYER **Oregon, Smith Rock State Park, Magic Light**

On February 21, Timothy Garland (24) climbed Magic Light in the Overboard Area of Smith Rock State Park. Magic Light is a bolted route rated 5.12b, two stars by Alan Watts in his *Climber's Guide to Smith Rock*. The lower portion is rated 5.11a and is often climbed, but the upper portion contains the real difficulties and is less frequently climbed according to Watts.

Tim easily reached the top anchors and was lowered off. He knew the rope was short and expected to be stopped to reset the top rope. Instead, he was lowered off the end of the top rope belay, falling a reported 75 to 100 feet sustaining a broken back, ribs, and sternum and internal injuries according to Oregon State Park records. He was air-lifted to St. Charles Hospital in Bend.

Analysis

Four months before this top rope failure, a similar serious incident had occurred at Smith Rock: The belayer dropped the top roped climber about 30 feet off the end of the rope. Typically, the belayer is concentrating on the climber being lowered, failing to mind the remaining belay rope. Sport climbers typically do not tie into the bottom end of the top belay rope. Tying a stopper knot or tying the rope into the sport rope bag would have prevented these incidents. Smith Rock Ranger David Slaight says he now reminds climbers to always tie a simple knot near the end of the belay rope.

Timothy Garland is a well liked 5.13 climber according to Redpoint Guide Jim Ablao, and is pictured in a popular climbing desk calendar. He is back climbing again, although the belayer, whose name was not released, has not climbed at Smith since the incident. (Source: Robert Speik)

FALL ON ROCK, PARTY SEPARATED

Oregon, North Sister

Dr. Bruce Shively (55) slipped on the steep friable volcanic rock slopes below the summit of North Sister and fell 600 vertical feet to his death, down one of three possible chutes. Shively was last seen about 2:30 p.m. on Saturday while descending the dangerous unstable slopes. He became separated from his female climbing partner who did not see him fall. She descended and two hours later borrowed a cell phone to call for Search and Rescue. At 4:30 pm. on Sunday, Dr. Shively's body was observed closely from an Oregon National Guard helicopter by Al Hornish, a mission manager with Deschutes County Search and Rescue. It was determined Shively had not survived the fall.

Dr. Shively's body was recovered by helicopter hoist on July 11, by Lane County Search and Rescue Personnel according to John Miller, SAR Coordinator.

Analysis

North Sister is a fourth-class climb to the summit, approached along the top of the south ridge by a faint climber's way high up along the west side of a gendarme called The Camel's Hump. The route then winds to the east side of a second gendarme, then traverses across an exposed friable 35 degree slope just under the Prouty Pinnacles to a gully called The Bowling Alley. Most groups, equipped with helmets and rock climbing skills, will elect to set a hand-line across this traverse and belay and rappel the loose gully to the summit.

Five climbers have died in recent years on North Sister, some from inexperience and a failure to mitigate the high exposure and objective dangers of this old volcano.